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Salvaging States’ Rights To Protect Children from 
Internet Predation: State Power To Regulate Internet 
Activity Under the Dormant Commerce Clause 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In June 2000, the National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children (“NCMEC”) released a sobering report, indicating that sexual 
predators on the Internet are targeting more children than previously 
thought. The report, entitled Online Victimization: A Report on the 
Nation’s Youth,1 concluded that in the United States, approximately one 
in five children ages ten to seventeen received a sexual solicitation or 
approach over the Internet in the past year alone.2 The study also found 
that of children the same age, three percent had received an aggressive 
sexual solicitation, meaning that the solicitor had sought to meet the 
child, successfully talked to the child on the telephone, or sent the child 
letters, money, or gifts.3 One child in seventeen was threatened or 
harassed.4 Of children who received such Internet solicitations, twenty-
 1. DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL., CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN RESEARCH CENTER, ONLINE 
VICTIMIZATION: A REPORT ON THE NATION’S YOUTH (2000), available at 
http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC62.pdf [hereinafter ONLINE VICTIMIZATION]. 
The studies included in the report were supported by a congressional grant to the National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children. Id. 
 2. Id. at ix. These statistics are based on a representative sample of 1,501 children who use 
the Internet regularly. Id. Specifically, nineteen percent of the children surveyed reported receiving a 
sexual solicitation while using the Internet. Id. at 1. Three percent of respondents claimed to have 
created a friendship with an adult over the Internet. Id. at 2. 
Girls were targeted for sexual solicitation sixty-six percent of the time, while only thirty-four 
percent of targeted victims were boys. Id. Most of the targeted youth were over the age of fourteen, 
but the twenty-two percent who were ages ten to thirteen found the episodes to be much more 
distressing. Id. 
Although only twenty-four percent of solicitations came from adults, the report indicates that 
this statistic may be misleading because “given the anonymity the Internet provides, . . . individuals 
may easily hide or misrepresent themselves.” Id. at 3. And, in fact, in twenty-seven percent of the 
cases, the child did not know the age of the person making the solicitation. Id.  
 3. Id. at ix. Of the aggressive solicitors, thirty-four percent identified themselves as adults to 
the victims. Id. at 3. In ten percent of the cases, the solicitor would ask to meet the child, and in two 
percent of the cases, the solicitor would call the child. Id. at 4. 
 4. Id. at ix. Boys and girls were targeted for harassment in nearly equal proportions (fifty-
one percent and forty-eight percent, respectively). Id. at 21. A majority of harassing episodes 
(seventy percent) were targeted at children between the ages of fourteen and seventeen. Id. 
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five percent reported the incident to a parent, but fewer than ten percent 
of the victims ever reported these sexual solicitations to law enforcement 
authorities or to the Internet provider.5
In light of these problems, the report concluded that many traditional 
attempt and solicitation statutes may not sufficiently address Internet 
solicitation and that “[a]lthough it is a daunting task, criminal statutes 
need to be systematically reviewed with the Internet in mind to make 
sure that relevant statutes cover Internet behaviors.”6 In response to these 
concerns, state legislatures have revised their criminal statutes to create a 
new species of crime called “Internet luring,” or “enticement.”7 Such a 
crime is patterned after the traditional crimes of solicitation and attempt 
but specifically addresses the sexual solicitation of a minor over the 
Internet. 
However, a recent series of federal cases threatens the validity of 
these statutes. Several federal courts have held that similar state laws, 
which prohibit the dissemination of pornography to minors via the 
Internet, are per se invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause because 
they impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. The severe 
limitation on state police power posed by these decisions threatens to 
block the ability of state governments to protect their citizens. As one 
scholar explained, “the dormant Commerce Clause argument, if 
accepted, threatens to invalidate nearly every state regulation of Internet 
communications . . . . This explains why the dormant Commerce Clause 
has been called a ‘nuclear bomb of a legal theory’ against state Internet 
regulations.”8
Although luring statutes have not yet been struck down under the 
dormant Commerce Clause, this line of reasoning provides Internet 
predators with grounds to challenge the constitutionality of these statutes. 
This Comment concludes that such challenges should fail because the per 
se approach used by certain federal courts is not warranted by Supreme 
Court jurisprudence.9 As such, courts should rely on the balancing 
 5. Id. at ix. 
 6. Id. at 40. 
 7. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
110 YALE L.J. 785, 787 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Declan McCullagh, 
Brick by Brick, TIME DIGITAL DAILY (Jan. 31, 1997), at 
http://www.time.com/time/digital/daily/0,2822,11738,00.html). 
 9. See infra Part III.A. 
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approach set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,10 which would 
generally uphold state regulation of the Internet stemming from a 
legitimate concern to protect minors from sexual predation. 
Part II of this Comment describes state Internet luring statutes and 
the Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and Part 
III demonstrates the confusion resulting from the divergent federal and 
state applications of the dormant Commerce Clause to state Internet 
regulation. Part IV argues that the per se approach used by federal courts 
is improper in this context and that the Pike balancing test provides a 
more suitable analysis. Finally, Part V offers a brief conclusion that 
reviews the constitutionality and necessity of state Internet statutes. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Internet Luring Statutes 
Many states have recently enacted what may be termed Internet 
luring statutes, which criminalize any attempt to knowingly solicit a 
minor to engage in sexual activity by communicating through the 
Internet.11 These statutes come in a variety of forms but generally punish 
 10. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefits.”). 
 11. To date, seventeen states have enacted Internet luring statutes: 
[A] person is guilty of solicitation of a child by a computer if the person is 19 years of 
age or older and the person knowingly, with the intent to commit an unlawful sex act, 
entices, induces, persuades, seduces, prevails, advises, coerces, or orders, by means of a 
computer, a child who is less than 16 years of age and at least three years younger than 
the defendant, to meet with the defendant or any other person for the purpose of engaging 
in sexual intercourse, sodomy, or to engage in a sexual performance, obscene sexual 
performance, or sexual conduct for his or her benefit. 
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-110(a) (2004);  
(a) A person commits computer child pornography if the person . . . (2) Knowingly 
utilizes a computer online service, Internet service, or local bulletin board service to 
seduce, solicit, lure, or entice or attempt to seduce, solicit, lure or entice a child or 
another individual believed by the person to be a child, to engage in sexually explicit 
conduct. 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-603(a)(2) (Michie 2003);  
A person is guilty of enticing a minor when such person uses an interactive computer 
service to knowingly persuade, induce, entice or coerce any person under sixteen years of 
age to engage in prostitution or sexual activity for which the actor may be charged with a 
criminal offense. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-90a(a) (2003);  
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A person is guilty of sexual solicitation of a child if the person, being 18 years of age or 
older, intentionally or knowingly . . . transmits, receives, exchanges, . . . including by 
means of computer, any notice, statement, document, advertisement, file or data 
containing the name, . . . e-mail address, . . . or other descriptive or identifying 
information pertaining to any child who has not yet reached his or her sixteenth birthday 
for the purpose of facilitating, encouraging, offering or soliciting a prohibited sexual act 
involving such child and such person or any other person. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112A(a)(3) (2004); 
Any person who knowingly utilizes a computer on-line service, Internet service, or local 
bulletin board service to seduce, solicit, lure, or entice, or attempt to seduce, solicit, lure, 
or entice, a child or another person believed by the person to be a child, to commit any 
illegal act . . . relating to sexual battery[,] . . . relating to lewdness and indecent 
exposure[,] or . . . relating to child abuse, commits a felony of the third degree . . . . 
FL. STAT. ch. 847.0135(3) (2004);  
Any person who, using a computer or any other electronic device: (a) Intentionally or 
knowingly communicates (i) With a minor known by the person to be under the age of 
eighteen years; (ii) With another person, in reckless disregard of the risk that the other 
person is under the age of eighteen years, and the other person is under the age of 
eighteen years; or (iii) With another person who represents that person to be under the 
age of eighteen years; and (b) With the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a 
felony . . . ; and (c) Intentionally or knowingly travels to the agreed upon meeting place at 
the agreed upon meeting time; is guilty of electronic enticement of a child in the first 
degree. 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-756(1) (2003);  
Any person who, using a computer or any other electronic device: (a) Intentionally or 
knowingly communicates (i) With a minor known by the person to be under the age of 
eighteen years; (ii) With another person, in reckless disregard of the risk that the other 
person is under the age of eighteen years, and the other person is under the age of 
eighteen years; or (iii) With another person who represents that person to be under the 
age of eighteen years; and (b) With the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a 
felony, agrees to meet with the minor, or with another person who represents that person 
to be a minor under the age of eighteen years  
. . . ; and (c) Intentionally or knowingly travels to the agreed upon meeting place at the 
agreed upon meeting time; is guilty of electronic enticement of a child in the second 
degree. 
id. § 707-757(1);  
(a) As used in this section, “solicit” means to command, authorize, urge, incite, request, 
or advise an individual . . . by using a computer network . . . to perform an act described 
in subsection (b). 
(b) A person eighteen (18) years of age or older who knowingly or intentionally solicits a 
child under fourteen (14) years of age, or an individual the person believes to be a child 
under fourteen (14) years of age, to engage in: (1) sexual intercourse; (2) deviate sexual 
conduct; or (3) any fondling or touching intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires 
of either the child or the older person; commits child solicitation, a Class D felony. 
IND. CODE § 35-42-6 (2004);  
1-A. A person is guilty of soliciting a child by a computer to commit a prohibited act if: 
A. The actor: (1) Uses a computer knowingly to solicit, entice, persuade or compel 
another person to meet with the actor; (2) Is at least 16 years of age; (3) Knows or 
believes that the other person is less than 14 years of age; and (4) Is at least 3 years 
older than the expressed age of the other person; and 
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B. The actor has the intent to engage in any one of the following prohibited acts 
with the other person: (1) A sexual act; . . . (2) Sexual contact; . . . or (3) Sexual 
exploitation of a minor . . . . 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 259 (Supp. 2004);  
(3)(a) A person is guilty of computer luring when: 
(i) Knowing the character and content of any communication of sexually oriented 
material, he intentionally uses any computer communication system allowing the 
input, output, examination or transfer of computer data or computer programs from 
one computer to another, to initiate or engage in such communication with a person 
under the age of eighteen (18); and 
(ii) By means of such communication he importunes, invites or induces a person 
under the age of eighteen (18) years to engage in sexual intercourse, deviant sexual 
intercourse or sexual contact with him, or to engage in a sexual performance, 
obscene sexual performance or sexual conduct for his benefit. 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-27(3)(a) (2004);  
(1) No person shall knowingly solicit, coax, entice, or lure (a) a child sixteen years of age 
or younger or (b) a peace officer who is believed by such person to be a child sixteen 
years of age or younger, by means of a computer . . . , to engage in an act which would 
[constitute sexual assault]. 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-320.02 (2004);  
4. A person who violates or attempts to violate the provisions of this section through the 
use of a computer, system, or network: (a) With the intent to engage in sexual conduct 
with the child or mentally ill person or to cause the child or mentally ill person to engage 
in sexual conduct, is guilty of a . . . felony . . . . 
NEV. REV. STAT. 201.560.4 (2004);  
Any person who knowingly utilizes a computer on-line service, Internet service, or local 
bulletin board service to seduce, solicit, lure, or entice, or attempt to seduce, lure, or 
entice, a child or another person believed by the person to be a child, to commit any of 
the following is guilty of a class B felony: 
I. Any offense . . . relative to sexual assault and related offenses. 
II. Indecent exposure and lewdness . . . . 
III. Endangering a child . . . . 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 649-B:4 (2004);  
Child luring consists of a person knowing and intentionally inducing a child under 
sixteen years of age, by means of computer, to engage in sexual intercourse, sexual 
contact or in a sexual or obscene performance, or to engage in any other sexual conduct 
when the perpetrator is at least three years older than the child. 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(B) (Michie 2004);  
(a) Offense.—A person is guilty of solicitation of a child by a computer if the person is 
16 years of age or older and the person knowingly, with the intent to commit an unlawful 
sex act, entices, advises, coerces, orders, or commands, by means of a computer, a child 
who is less than 16 years of age and at least 3 years younger than the defendant, to meet 
with the defendant or any other person for the purpose of committing an unlawful sex act. 
(b) Jurisdiction.—The offense is committed in the State for purposes of determining 
jurisdiction, if the transmission that constitutes the offense either originates in the State or 
is received in the State. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.3 (2004);  
An adult is guilty of luring minors by computer when: 
(1) The adult knows the character and content of a communication that, in whole or in 
part, implicitly or explicitly discusses or depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual acts, 
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any person who (1) uses a computer or similar device; (2) to contact a 
person whom he knows or believes to be a minor; (3) to solicit, 
encourage, entice, or lure him or her; (4) for the purposes of engaging in 
sexual activity in violation of state laws.12
Internet luring statutes are necessary because most state statutes 
punishing the solicitation or attempted rape of minors impose stringent 
requirements on state prosecutors. Many attempt statutes, for example, 
require that evidence strongly corroborate an intent to commit a crime.13 
sexual contact . . . and uses any computer communication system that allows the input, 
output, examination, or transfer of computer data or computer programs from one 
computer to another to initiate or engage in such communication with a person the adult 
believes to be a minor; and (2) By means of that communication the adult importunes, 
invites, or induces a person the adult believes to be a minor to engage in sexual acts or to 
have sexual contact with the adult, or to engage in a sexual performance, obscene sexual 
performance, or sexual conduct for the adult’s benefit, satisfaction, lust, passions, or 
sexual desires. 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-05.1 (2003);  
(1) A person commits enticement of a minor over the Internet when the person knowingly 
uses a computer to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice, or attempts to use a computer to solicit, 
seduce, lure, or entice a minor or a person the defendant believes to be a minor to engage 
in any sexual activity which is a violation of state criminal law. (2) It is not a defense to 
the crime of enticing a minor under Subsection (1), or an attempt to commit this offense, 
that a law enforcement officer or an undercover operative who is working with a law 
enforcement agency was involved in the detection or investigation of the offense. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-401 (2004);  
(1) Whoever uses a computerized communication system to communicate with an 
individual who the actor believes or has reason to believe has not attained the age of 16 
years with intent to have sexual contact or sexual intercourse with the individual . . . is 
guilty of a Class D felony. (2) This section does not apply if, at the time of the 
communication, the actor reasonably believed that the age of the person to whom the 
communication was sent was no more than 24 months less than the age of the actor. 
WIS. STAT. § 948.075 (2004). The federal government has also enacted legislation prohibiting the 
sexual enticement of minors: 
(b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce . . 
. knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained 
the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person 
can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined . . . and 
imprisoned. 
18 U.S.C. § 2422 (2004). 
 12. Notably, Hawaii requires the additional element that the defendant travels to an agreed 
meeting place at an agreed time. See HAW REV. STAT. § 707-756, -757 (2004). 
 13. Generally,  
[a] defendant’s “act” qualifies as an attempt when, for example, it constitutes a 
“substantial step”, and “overt act”, or an “act” toward the commission of a crime; or 
when it “tends to effect” the commission of a crime. In accordance with some statutes, an 
act amounts to a “substantial step” only if “it is strongly corroborative of the actor’s 
criminal purpose.” 
CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 696 (15th ed. 1996 & Supp. 2004). 
4SOR-FIN 5/11/2005 12:04:39 PM 
191] Internet Luring Statutes and the Dormant Commerce Clause 
 197 
 
Internet luring statutes, on the other hand, require a reduced evidentiary 
burden14 and consequently impose a lesser penalty on the perpetrator.15 
Thus, Internet luring statutes allow states to convict predators whose 
sexual enticement of minors would otherwise fail to meet the solicitation 
or attempt requirements.16  
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
State regulation of the Internet presents issues of federalism, 
particularly under the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause grants 
Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several 
States”17 and is traditionally understood to have two facets: an 
affirmative power and a negative power. On one hand, the affirmative 
grant of power allows Congress to regulate interstate and foreign 
commerce.18 Courts and Congress have interpreted interstate commerce 
to include a variety of technologies in transporting materials and signals, 
 14. Unlike attempt statutes, Internet luring statutes do not require evidence of a “substantial 
step.” The prosecutor need only prove that the defendant knowingly used a computer to 
communicate with a person the defendant believed to be a minor and that the defendant intended on 
engaging in sexual activity with the minor. Compare supra note 11 (listing state statutes) with supra 
note 13 (describing state attempt statutes).  
 15. Generally, penalties for Internet luring are reduced by one degree from the underlying 
crime. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-401 (2004). 
 16. The Utah Court of Appeals provides an explanation of the distinction between traditional 
solicitation or attempt statutes and Internet luring:  
For example, the crime of Internet [luring] would be more appropriate in a case where, as 
here, a defendant solicits sex from an undercover police officer on the Internet believing 
he is communicating with a minor. In such a case, attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation 
may be difficult to prove because the State must establish the defendant’s actions are 
“strongly corroborative” of an intent to commit a felony or involve an “overt act.” The 
charge of Internet enticement would be more appropriate because it does not require 
“strong corroboration” of intent. 
  In contrast, the defendant may contact a minor via the Internet, meet the minor, and 
be on the verge of consummating a felonious sexual act with the minor before being 
stopped by police. In that case, the higher crime of attempt, for example, would be 
appropriate because the State could probably prove “strong corroboration” of an intent to 
commit the underlying felony. 
State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App. 326, 100 P.3d 231, 237–38 (citations omitted). 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 18. This power is generally divided into three categories: (1) power to “regulate the use of 
the channels of interstate commerce,” (2) power to “regulate and protect the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,” and (3) “power to regulate those 
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598, 609 (2000) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995)); 
see also Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147 (2003). 
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including telecommunications.19 On the other hand, the “negative” or 
“dormant” aspect.20 of the Commerce Clause prohibits states from 
enacting any law that “discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate 
commerce and thereby imped[es] free private trade in the national 
marketplace.”21 Thus, courts may presume that state action is prohibited 
even though Congress has not enacted pertinent legislation. 
1. Dormant Commerce Clause analysis 
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has developed into two 
primary tests. First, courts consider whether the regulation is facially 
discriminatory against out-of-state commerce, in which case the state 
regulation is subject to “the strictest of scrutiny of any purported 
legitimate local purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory 
alternatives.”22 Since discriminatory regulations seldom, if ever, 
withstand strict scrutiny, courts typically consider them per se invalid.23
Second, if a state statute is not facially discriminatory, it may still be 
invalid if it unduly burdens interstate commerce. In Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc.,24 the Supreme Court articulated the test for determining 
 19. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 177 (1907) (noting that the Commerce 
Clause allows Congress to regulate “traffic, intercourse, trade, navigation, communication, the 
transit of persons and the transmission of messages by telegraph”). Congress has also included 
telecommunications as modes of interstate commerce as explained in its legislative findings to the 
Telecommunications Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 901(b) (2001). 
 20. Gen. Motors v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997) (noting that the dormant aspect of the 
Commerce Clause is only triggered when the burden on interstate commerce is excessive). 
 21. Id. at 287 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). For a more general overview of the 
purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause, see Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 8, at 2. 
 22. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (striking down an Oklahoma statute 
favoring in-state over out-of-state minnow fishers on grounds of facial discrimination). 
 23. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978) (“The opinions of the Court 
through the years have reflected an alertness to the evils of ‘economic isolation’ and protectionism, 
while at the same time recognizing that incidental burdens on interstate commerce may be 
unavoidable when a State legislates to safeguard the health and safety of its people. Thus, where 
simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has 
been erected. The clearest example of such legislation is a law that overtly blocks the flow of 
interstate commerce at a State’s borders.” (citations omitted)). 
Examples of invalid state statutes include those aimed at erecting barriers to outside 
competition, such as in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); keeping industries in the 
state to promote job growth, as in Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928); 
advantaging local companies with a compensatory tax, as in So. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 
U.S. 160 (1999); requiring businesses to use state products, as in Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 
437 (1992); or preventing the export of state resources, as in New England Power Co. v. New 
Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982). 
 24. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
4SOR-FIN 5/11/2005 12:04:39 PM 
191] Internet Luring Statutes and the Dormant Commerce Clause 
 199 
 
when state regulations unduly burden interstate commerce, explaining 
that “[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are 
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.”25 The Court went on to indicate that these factors were to be 
assessed as part of a balancing test: 
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of 
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of 
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on 
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate 
activities. Occasionally the Court has candidly undertaken a balancing 
approach in resolving these issues, but more frequently it has spoken in 
terms of “direct” and “indirect” effects and burdens.26
The difficulties of performing such a balance and determining the 
appropriate “weight” of its different elements were illustrated in Kassel 
v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,27 a plurality opinion in which the 
Justices divided over how to factor a state’s interest in public safety. The 
case involved an Iowa law limiting the length of trucks passing through 
the state, a law that the state claimed was motivated by safety concerns.28 
Justice Powell’s opinion, which received four votes,29 emphasized that a 
state’s interest in health and safety is a substantial factor in determining 
the extent of a state’s police power: “[A] State’s power to regulate 
commerce is never greater than in matters traditionally of local 
concern,”30 and, in particular, a state’s interest in safety is among “those 
that ‘the Court has been most reluctant to invalidate.’”31 Those 
challenging such interests must “overcome a ‘strong presumption of 
validity,’”32 but the Powell opinion also warned that “the incantation of a 
purpose to promote the public health or safety does not insulate a state 
 25. Id. at 142 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)). 
 26. Id. (citing So. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 
268 U.S. 189 (1925)). 
 27. 450 U.S. 662 (1981). 
 28. Consolidated Freightways, a major nationwide trucking company, challenged an Iowa 
statute prohibiting the use of “65-foot doubles” within its borders. Id. at 664–65. Because most of 
the states in the Midwest permitted such trucks, Consolidated would be forced to switch its fleet to 
either fifty-five foot singles or sixty-foot doubles, or change trucks before entering Iowa. Id. 
 29. Justice Powell was joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. at 664. 
 30. Id. at 670 (citing Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977)). 
 31. Id. (quoting Raymond Motor Trans., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443 (1978)). 
 32. Id. (quoting Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959)). 
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law from Commerce Clause attack.”33 Powell concluded that a court’s 
analysis should include “a sensitive consideration of the weight and 
nature of the state regulatory concern in light of the extent of the burden 
imposed on the course of interstate commerce.”34 In striking down the 
statute, Justice Powell concluded that the state’s safety interest was 
insufficient to justify its burden on interstate commerce for two reasons. 
First, the state was unable to prove that sixty-five-foot double trailers 
were less safe than fifty-five-foot single trailers. Second, the Court also 
noted that the Iowa law was “out of step with the laws of all other 
Midwestern and Western States.”35
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan36 seemed generally to agree 
with Justice Powell’s approach but explained that “[t]he burdens 
imposed on commerce must be balanced against the local benefits 
actually sought to be achieved by the State’s lawmakers, and not against 
those suggested after the fact by counsel.”37 In a dissenting opinion, 
Justice Rehnquist.38 warned that any “balancing” of safety versus costs to 
commerce is an illusion.39 Rather, the court must give deference to the 
safety determination of the state unless it is “merely a pretext for 
discrimination against interstate commerce.”40  
In sum, Kassel demonstrates the Court’s willingness to recognize a 
state’s safety interest but leaves unclear how much weight that interest 
should be given. This ambiguity suggests that the relative importance of 
the state safety interest should be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 670–71 (quoting Raymond, 434 U.S. at 441). 
 35. Id. at 671. 
 36. Justice Brennan was joined by Justice Marshall. Id. at 679. 
 37. Id. at 679–80. (“For me, analysis of Commerce Clause challenges to state regulations 
must take into account three principles: (1) The courts are not empowered to second-guess the 
empirical judgments of lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation. (2) The burdens imposed on 
commerce must be balanced against the local benefits actually sought to be achieved by the State’s 
lawmakers, and not against those suggested after the fact by counsel. (3) Protectionist legislation is 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, even if the burdens and benefits are related to safety 
rather than economics.”). 
 38. Id. at 687. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart. 
 39. Id. at 691 (noting the impropriety of attempting to “directly compare safety benefits to 
commerce costs and strik[ing] down the legislation if the latter can be said in some vague sense to 
‘outweigh’ the former”). 
 40. Id. at 692. Justice Rehnquist went on to explain that evidence of pretext exists when the 
state’s safety benefits are “slight or problematical.” Id. 
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2. Additional considerations 
In recent years, the Court has taken into account additional 
considerations without explaining how they affect the Pike balancing 
analysis. Primary among these factors is concern for state regulations 
that either (1) regulate wholly extraterritorial activity or (2) subject users 
of interstate commerce to inconsistent regulations.  
 
a. Extraterritorial effect. First, the Court has scrutinized state 
legislation that allows a state to enforce its regulatory standards 
extraterritorially. In Healy v. Beer Institute, the Court struck down a 
Connecticut statute that, in essence, required out-of-state beer shippers to 
establish on a monthly basis that their prices were not higher than those 
in the three neighboring states.41 Although the Court concluded that the 
statute was facially discriminatory against interstate beer shippers,42 the 
Court also explained that “the ‘Commerce Clause . . . precludes the 
application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside 
of the State’s borders.’”43 Such state statutes “exceed[] the inherent 
limits of the enacting State’s authority and [are] invalid regardless of 
whether the statute’s extraterritorial reach was intended by the 
legislature.”44 In sum, “[t]he critical inquiry is whether the practical 
effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the 
State.”45  
 
b. Inconsistent regulation of interstate commerce. Second, the Court 
has expressed a concern that certain forms of state regulation “adversely 
affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent 
 41. 491 U.S. 324, 326–27 (1989). 
 42. Id. at 340–41. 
 43. Id. at 336 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982) (omission in 
original)). The Court concluded that the Connecticut statute had “the practical effect of controlling 
Massachusetts prices” because “when a brewer posts his . . . prices for Massachusetts, that brewer 
must take account of the price he hopes to charge in Connecticut.” Id. at 338; see also Edgar, 457 
U.S. at 643 (plurality opinion) (“[A]ny attempt ‘directly’ to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
persons or property would offend sister States and exceed the inherent limits of the State’s power.” 
(quoting Schaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977))). 
 44. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336. Justice Cardozo summed up this concern by noting that “New 
York has no power to project its legislation into Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in that 
state for milk acquired there.” Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935). 
 45. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 
476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)). 
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regulations.”46 In Healy, the Court recognized that “the Commerce 
Clause protects against inconsistent legislation arising from the 
projection of one state[’s] regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of 
another State.”47 Although not specifying the necessary factors to 
consider, the Court emphasized its desire to avoid the scenario in which 
“an out-of-state merchant [must] seek regulatory approval in one State 
before undertaking a transaction in another.”48
Although the Court’s consideration of the extraterritorial effects and 
inconsistent regulations resulting from state laws appears to be an 
important aspect of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, it remains 
unclear whether these play a part in the Pike balance or whether they 
stand as independent tests.49 Commentators have acknowledged this 
confusion and have also noted, moreover, that the exact scope of these 
two factors is uncertain because most businesses expect to operate under 
some degree of inconsistent extraterritorial regulations.50
 
III. RECENT DECISIONS REGARDING STATE REGULATION  
OF THE INTERNET 
Recent cases in which federal courts have greatly reduced the ability 
of states to regulate the Internet have called into question the 
constitutional viability of state Internet luring statutes. However, several 
state courts have asserted the rights of states to regulate the Internet when 
the state has a strong local interest. This has created a conflicting body of 
case law that threatens to impede, or at least confuse, a state’s ability to 
protect minors from Internet predation. 
 46. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987) (finding that differing 
regulations from state to state does not necessarily imply problematic inconsistent regulations). 
 47. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336–37 (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 
88–89 (1987)). 
 48. Id. at 337 (citing Brown-Forman, 476 U.S at 582). 
 49. See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 8, at 789–90 (citing Daniel R. Fischel, From MITE 
to CTS: State Anti-Takeover Statutes, the Williams Act, the Commerce Clause, and Insider Trading, 
1987 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 88–90; Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. 
of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1884 (1987)). 
 50. Id. at 790 (“[F]irms that operate in interstate commerce often face different regulations in 
different states. To take two of dozens of examples, the dormant Commerce Clause permits states to 
apply local conceptions of tort law (say, strict liability) to multistate corporate activity with a local 
contact, even if other states apply different tort regimes (say, negligence), and it permits states to 
apply different blue-sky laws to the same multistate securities offering.” (citing Edgar v. MITE 
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641 (1982))). 
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A. Federal Cases: State Regulation of the Internet Per Se Invalid 
Beginning with American Library Ass’n v. Pataki,51 federal courts 
have adopted an approach that makes state regulation of the Internet per 
se invalid. Although federal courts have not yet reviewed the validity of 
state Internet luring statutes, they have struck down other statutes 
intended to protect minors from sexually explicit and harmful Internet 
material. Nonetheless, the following discussion ends by noting that this 
trend may be weakening, as evidenced by the Fourth Circuit’s recent 
holding in which it relies on Pataki, yet opts to apply the Pike balancing 
test. 
1. American Library Ass’n v. Pataki 
In one of the most influential cases on this issue, a New York district 
court in American Library Ass’n v. Pataki determined that a state statute 
outlawing the dissemination of pornography to minors was per se invalid 
because the state law imposed, at least in theory, its limits 
extraterritorially to all Internet users.52 In Pataki, a group of individuals 
and organizations—who regularly use the Internet to communicate, 
disseminate, and display information—brought an action challenging a 
New York statute (the “New York Act”) criminalizing the dissemination 
of information that is harmful to minors.53 The plaintiffs claimed the 
 51. 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 161–62; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21(3) (McKinney 2004). The Act in 
question amended section 235.21 of the New York Penal Law. Dissemination of Indecent Material 
to Minors Through Any Computer Communication System § 5, 1996 N.Y. Laws 600 § 210-E 
(codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21). The amendment added a new subdivision, making it a 
crime for an individual: 
Knowing the character and content of the communication which, in whole or in part, 
depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse, and which 
is harmful to minors, [to] intentionally use[] any computer communication system 
allowing the input, output, examination or transfer, of computer data or computer 
programs from one computer to another, to initiate or engage in such communication 
with a person who is a minor. 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21 (McKinney 2004). Violation of the Act is a Class E felony, punishable 
by one to four years of incarceration. The Act applies to both commercial and noncommercial 
dissemination of materials. Section 235.20(6) defines “harmful to minors” as: 
that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual 
conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it: 
(a) Considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors; and 
(b) Is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole 
with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and 
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New York Act was unconstitutional because it unduly burdened 
interstate commerce,54 and the court agreed, holding that the statute was 
per se invalid.55 To further support its conclusion, the court held in the 
alternative that the statute was invalid under the Pike balancing test.56
 
a. Per se analysis. The court began by reasoning that, as an 
“information superhighway,” the Internet is “an instrument of interstate 
commerce, albeit an innovative one,”57 and therefore naturally triggers 
dormant Commerce Clause concerns.58 Relying heavily on Healy, the 
court then determined that the New York Act was “per se violative of the 
Commerce Clause”59 because any incident of extraterritorial regulation 
automatically invalidates a state statute. In essence, the nature of the 
Internet makes “it impossible to restrict the effects of the New York Act 
to conduct occurring within New York.”60 Therefore, “conduct that may 
be legal in the state in which the user acts can subject the user to 
prosecution in New York and thus subordinate the user’s home state’s 
policy—perhaps favoring freedom of expression over a more protective 
stance—to New York’s local concerns.”61
 
b. Pike balancing and inconsistent regulations. The court further 
explained that even if the Act were not a per se violation of the 
Commerce Clause on grounds of its extraterritorial impact, the Act 
would fail under the Pike balancing test because “the burdens it imposes 
on interstate commerce are excessive in relation to the local benefits it 
confers.”62 In applying this test, the court readily accepted the 
“quintessentially legitimate state objective” of protecting children against 
(c) Considered as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political and scientific 
value for minors. 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20(6) (McKinney 2004). 
 54. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 161. Plaintiffs also asserted a First Amendment argument, which 
the court declined to address. Id. at 183. 
 55. Id. at 177. 
 56. Id. at 177–81. 
 57. Id. at 161, 173. 
 58. Id. at 169, 173. 
 59. Id. at 177. The court also relied on Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982), a 
case which concluded that an Illinois statute was a “direct restraint on interstate commerce and . . . 
ha[d] a sweeping extraterritorial effect” because the statute would prevent a tender offeror from 
communicating its offer to shareholders both within and outside of Illinois. 
 60. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 177. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 177. 
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pedophilia,63 but ultimately determined that “[t]he local benefits likely to 
result from the New York Act are not overwhelming.”64 The Act would 
“almost certainly fail to accomplish” the state interest of protecting 
minors from sexual material on the Internet because “nearly half of 
Internet communications originate outside the United States, and some 
percentage of that figure represents pornography.”65
Similarly, the court noted that the benefits of the Act are attenuated 
because New York would have difficulty asserting jurisdiction over 
parties whose only contact with the state occurred through incidental 
Internet communications.66 Next, the court considered the extreme 
burden resulting from the Act—primarily the chilling effect on Internet 
users worldwide.67 Based on the above factors, the court concluded that 
the “severe burden on interstate commerce . . . is not justifiable in light 
of the attenuated local benefits arising from it.”68 Finally, the court noted 
that “certain types of commerce demand consistent treatment and are 
therefore susceptible to regulation only on a national level”69 because 
any state’s regulation is likely to conflict with laws enacted by any other 
 63. Id. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982)) (“It is evident beyond the 
need for elaboration that a State’s interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-
being of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’” (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 
607 (1982))). 
 64. Id. at 178. 
 65. Id. (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). 
 66. Id.  
[I]n the present case, New York’s prosecution of parties from out of state who have  
allegedly violated the Act, but whose only contact with New York occurs via the Internet, 
is beset with practical difficulties, even if New York is able to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over such parties. The prospect of New York bounty hunters dragging 
pedophiles from the other 49 states into New York is not consistent with traditional 
concepts of comity. 
Id. 
 67. Id. at 179–80.  
The New York Act casts its net worldwide; moreover, the chilling effect that it produces 
is bound to exceed the actual cases that are likely to be prosecuted, as Internet users will 
steer clear of the Act by [a] significant margin. . . . [The court concluded that] the range 
of Internet communications potentially affected by the Act is far broader than the State 
suggests.  
Id. at 180. “For example, many libraries, museums, and academic institutions [regularly] post art on 
the Internet that some might conclude was ‘harmful to minors.’” Id. Furthermore, the costs incurred 
by organizations and institutions to comply with the Act are excessive. Id. 
 68. Id. at 181. 
 69. Id. (emphasis added). 
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state and because such inconsistent regulation can “only result in 
chaos.”70
2. Post-Pataki federal cases 
The Pataki analysis provided the framework for subsequent federal 
cases involving challenges to Internet statutes. To date, few federal 
circuits have reviewed dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state 
Internet regulations protecting minors, yet of those that have, each has 
adopted the Pataki per se line of reasoning. 
 
a. ACLU v. Johnson. Two years after Pataki, the Tenth Circuit in 
ACLU v. Johnson invalidated an Internet dissemination statute as per se 
unconstitutional.71 Following the dormant Commerce Clause analysis in 
Pataki, the Tenth Circuit struck down a New Mexico statute designed to 
criminalize the dissemination of material by computer that is harmful to 
a minor.72 Because the statute at issue represented an attempt to regulate 
 70. Id. To support its assertion that the Internet requires a “cohesive national scheme of 
regulation so that users are reasonably able to determine their obligations,” the court relied heavily 
upon numerous historical cases in which “the Supreme Court has acknowledged the need for 
coordination in the regulation of certain areas of commerce [e.g., trains, highways].” Id. at 182. 
 71. 194 F.3d 1149, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999). The case involved various organizations and 
individuals who used and accessed the Internet for a variety of purposes. Id. at 1149. Plaintiffs 
argued that the New Mexico legislature enacted a statute that limited their “discussions of women’s 
health and interests, literary works and fine art, gay and lesbian issues, prison rapes, and censorship 
and civil liberties issues.” Id. at 1153. New Mexico contended, however, that the statute, designed to 
criminalize the dissemination of sexually explicit material to minors, served the compelling state 
interest of protecting minors from harmful material. Id. at 1161. 
 72. Id. at 1164. The New Mexico legislature enacted section 30-37-3.2(A), which provided as 
follows: 
Dissemination of material that is harmful to a minor by computer consists of the use of a 
computer communications system that allows the input, output, examination or transfer 
of computer data or computer programs from one computer to another, to knowingly and 
intentionally initiate or engage in communication with a person under eighteen years of 
age when such communication in whole or in part depicts actual or simulated nudity, 
sexual intercourse or any other sexual conduct. Whoever commits dissemination of 
material that is harmful to a minor by computer is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2 (Michie 1998). The statute provided the following defenses: 
In a prosecution for dissemination of material that is harmful to a minor by computer, it is 
a defense that the defendant has: 
(1) in good faith taken reasonable, effective and appropriate actions under the 
circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to indecent materials on 
computer, including any method that is feasible with available technology; 
(2) restricted access to indecent materials by requiring the use of a verified credit card, 
debit account, adult access code or adult personal identification number; or 
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interstate commerce occurring outside the borders of New Mexico, the 
court invalidated the statute as a per se violation of the Commerce 
Clause.73 The court first stated that the statute “contains no express 
limitation confining it to communications which occur wholly within its 
borders,”74 and thus “applies to any communication, intrastate or 
interstate, that fits within the prohibition and over which [New Mexico] 
has the capacity to exercise criminal jurisdiction.”75 Accordingly, the 
Tenth Circuit agreed with the Pataki court that state Internet regulation 
“cannot effectively be limited to purely intrastate communications over 
the Internet because no such communications exist.”76
 
b. American Booksellers Foundation v. Dean. The Second Circuit 
also adopted the Pataki reasoning in American Booksellers Foundation v. 
Dean, a case involving a Vermont dissemination statute similar to New 
Mexico’s.77 The court found that the statute violated the dormant 
(3) in good faith established a mechanism such as labeling, segregation or other 
means that enables the indecent material to be automatically blocked or screened by 
software or other capability reasonably available to persons who wish to effect such 
blocking or screening and the defendant has not otherwise solicited a minor not 
subject to such screening or blocking capabilities to access the indecent material or 
to circumvent screening or blocking. 
 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-38-3.2(C) (Michie 1998). 
 73. ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1161. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169–70 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)). 
 76. Id. (quoting Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 171). The court further discussed the Pike balancing 
test as outlined in Pataki and concluded that the regulation imposed burdens on interstate commerce 
that exceeded any local benefits conferred by the statute. Id. at 1161–62. The court also agreed with 
Pataki that the regulation violated the Commerce Clause because “it subject[ed] the use of the 
Internet to inconsistent regulations.” Id. at 1162. 
 77. Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 2003). Vermont Governor 
Howard Dean signed into law Act No. 124, “An Act Relating to Internet Crimes,” in 2000. Id. at 99. 
The Act extended title 13, section 2802 of the Vermont statute’s prohibition against distributing to 
minors sexually explicit materials that are “harmful to minors” to include distribution or 
dissemination through the Internet. Id. In 2001, as a response to plaintiff’s declaratory and injunctive 
relief from enforcement of the statute, the Vermont General Assembly passed Act No. 41, which  
limited 13 V.S.A. § 2802 to dissemination of indecent material to a minor “in the 
presence of a minor” and created a new provision, 13 V.S.A. § 2802a, which prohibited 
dissemination to minors of indecent material that is “harmful to minors” when the 
dissemination occurs “outside the presence of the minor” but the disseminator has “actual 
knowledge” that the recipient is a minor. 
Id. (quoting 2001 Vt. Acts & Resolves 41). The entirety of title 13, section 2802a(a) of the Vermont 
statute reads as follows: 
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Commerce Clause and was per se invalid because of its burden on 
interstate commerce. In closely examining the factors that “may burden 
interstate commerce,”78 the court concluded that the statute does not 
incidentally burden interstate commerce, nor does it “discriminate 
against interstate commerce on its face.”79 Instead, Vermont “ha[d] 
‘projected its legislation’ into other States, and directly regulated 
commerce therein.”80 Accordingly, the Second Circuit struck down the 
statute as per se unconstitutional. The court considered only one factor in 
its per se analysis: the statute’s extraterritorial effects.81 Similar to 
Pataki, the court reasoned that because “[a] person outside Vermont who 
posts information on a website or on an electronic discussion group 
cannot prevent people in Vermont from accessing the material,” those 
“outside Vermont must comply with Section 2802a or risk prosecution 
(a) No person may, with knowledge of its character and content, and with actual 
knowledge that the recipient is a minor, sell, lend, distribute or give away: 
(1) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, or similar visual 
representation or image, including any such representation or image which is 
communicated, transmitted, or stored electronically, of a person or portion of the human 
body which depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which is 
harmful to minors; or 
(2) any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter, however reproduced, or sound 
recording which contains any matter enumerated in subdivision (1) of this subsection, or 
explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual excitement, 
sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to 
minors. 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802a(a) (2000). “Harmful to minors” is defined by title 13, section 
2801(6) of the Vermont Statutes Annotated as material that: 
(A) Predominately appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors; and 
(B) Is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community in the state of 
Vermont as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and 
(C) . . . [T]aken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, for 
minors. 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2801(6) (2000). 
Sexual Health Network, Inc. (SHN) provided sex-related information, particularly to those 
“with disabilities, illnesses, and changes in their lifestyle” and dispersed such information primarily 
through an Internet website. See Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 98. The Web site contained 
information on a variety of sex-related topics, some even considered controversial and inappropriate 
for minors. Id. The Vermont government argued that the content was “harmful to minors” because 
some of the topics included “sexual addiction, advice for making safe sex practices more erotic, 
guidelines on the safe practice of bondage sadomasochistic activities, and information on how those 
with disabilities can experience sexual pleasure.” Id. 
 78. Id. at 102. 
 79. Id. at 104. 
 80. Id. (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 
584 (1986)). 
 81. Id. at 103. 
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by Vermont.”82 Consequently, although Vermont intended only to 
protect its minors with Section 2802a, Vermont “projected”83 its 
regulation on the rest of the nation and forced all citizens of any state to 
comply or risk prosecution.84 In reaching its conclusion, the court 
emphasized its assumption that the “internet’s boundary-less nature 
means that internet commerce does not quite ‘occur[] wholly outside 
[Vermont’s] borders.’”85
In the alternative, the court asserted that the statute failed to pass 
constitutional muster because “the [Commerce] Clause ‘protects against 
inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of one state regulatory 
regime into the jurisdiction of another.’”86 The court then reached the 
bold conclusion that states have no authority to regulate the Internet: 
“We think it likely that the internet will soon be seen as falling within the 
class of subjects that are protected from State regulation because they 
‘imperatively demand[] a single uniform rule.’”87
 
c. PSINET, Inc. v. Chapman. Contrary to the per se approach applied 
by some other federal circuits, the Fourth Circuit in PSINET, Inc. v. 
Chapman utilized the Pike balancing test to strike down a Virginia 
dissemination statute.88 Interestingly, the court mentioned Pataki but did 
 82. Id.; see also Am. Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“An 
internet user who posts a Web page cannot prevent New Yorkers or Oklahomans or Iowans from 
accessing that page and will not even know from what state visitors to that site hail. Nor can a 
participant in a chat room prevent other participants from a particular state from joining the 
conversation.”). 
 83. Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 103; see Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 332–34 
(1989) (“A state law that has the ‘practical effect’ of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside 
that State’s borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause . . . . [A state is] ‘prohibited by the 
Commerce Clause from project[ing] its legislation into [other States].’” (second and third alterations 
in original) (quoting Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 583 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935)))). 
 84. Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 103. 
 85. Id. (quoting Healy, 491 U.S. at 332). 
 86. Id. at 104 (quoting Healy, 491 U.S. at 337). 
 87. Id. (quoting Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851)) (noting that the mere 
grant of power to Congress compatible with the existence of similar power in states does not “imply 
prohibition on states to exercise the same power”). 
 88. 362 F.3d 227, 239–40 (4th Cir. 2004). The Virginia dissemination statute was reenacted 
as amended in 2000 and in its present form makes it unlawful to “‘sell, rent or loan to a juvenile’ . . . 
or to knowingly display for commercial purpose in a manner whereby juveniles may examine and 
peruse” the following: 
1. Any picture, photography, drawing, sculpture, motion picture [film], electronic file or 
message containing an image, or similar visual representation or image of a person or 
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not reference or make use of its per se test; rather, it simply balanced the 
two-fold Pike inquiry, which “first looks at the legitimacy of the state’s 
interest and secondly weighs the burden on interstate commerce in light 
of the local benefit derived from the statute.”89 The court held that the 
burden—of applying the regulation to all Internet users, even those in 
other states—outweighed any local benefit derived from the statute.90
B. State Cases: No Per Se Rule 
Unlike federal cases addressing dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges to state Internet regulations, state courts have consistently 
rejected the Pataki reasoning and upheld state police power to regulate 
Internet activity harmful to minors.91 These state cases have adopted 
various approaches ultimately concluding that either Internet luring of a 
minor is not legitimate commerce, and thus not subject to a dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis, or that the state’s safety interest outweighs 
the incidental burden on commerce. 
1. People v. Foley 
In People v. Foley, the Court of Appeals of New York upheld, under 
the state’s police power, the constitutionality of a state luring statute 
because the court determined the statute did not affect any legitimate 
commerce.92 The New York luring statute copied the language of the 
New York dissemination statute struck down in Pataki but added the 
portion of the human body which depicts sexually explicit nudity, sexual conduct or 
sadomasochistic abuse and which is harmful to juveniles, or 
2. Any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however reproduced, electronic file or 
message containing words, or sound recording which contains any matter enumerated in 
subdivision 1 of this subsection, or explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative 
accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse and which, taken 
as a whole, is harmful to juveniles. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-391 (Michie 1999) (amended 2000). 
 89. PSINET, 362 F.3d at 239–40. 
 90. Id. at 240. 
 91. See People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Foley, 731 
N.E.2d 123 (N.Y. 2000); State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001). 
 92. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123 (N.Y. 2000). In this case, a fifty-one-year-old man discussed 
sexually explicit acts and desires in an Internet chatroom with a person he believed to be a fifteen-
year-old girl but who was actually an undercover police officer. Id. at 126. “During the conversation, 
[Foley] sent ‘Aimee’ several pictures of ‘preteen girls and men’ engaging in sexual acts.” Id. As 
Foley and “Aimee” engaged in their fifth online conversation within eight weeks, the police 
executed a no-knock search warrant at Foley’s residence and found him typing at his computer, 
engaged in a conversation discussing where he and Aimee could meet to have sex. Id. 
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requirement that the communication be used to induce a minor to engage 
in sexual or obscene performance for the benefit of the sender.93 The 
court held that the statute did not implicate the dormant Commerce 
Clause because the court could not “ascertain any legitimate commerce 
that is derived from the intentional transmission of sexually graphic 
images to minors for the purpose of luring them into sexual activity.”94 
The court emphasized that without an effect on any legitimate 
commerce, the conduct “deserves no ‘economic’ protection” and was 
thus subject to the state’s police power.95
2. Hatch v. Superior Court 
In Hatch v. Superior Court, a case similar to Foley, the California 
Court of Appeals concluded that Pataki was inapplicable to the 
California Internet luring statute for two reasons.96 First, the court 
considered whether the state statute would subject Internet users to 
inconsistent regulations. Although the court conceded that the Pataki 
court’s analysis may be valid for bans “on the simple communication of 
certain materials [which] may interfere with an adult’s legitimate 
rights,”97 the court held that luring statutes fundamentally involve a 
different purpose for communicating. The court explained that “a ban on 
communication of specified matter to a minor for purposes of seduction 
can only affect the rights of the very narrow class of adults who intend to 
 93. Id. New York Penal Law section 235.22 provides: 
A person is guilty of disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree when: 
1. knowing the character and content of the communication which, in whole or in 
part, depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse, 
and which is harmful to minors, he intentionally uses any computer communication 
system allowing the input, output, examination or transfer, of computer data or 
computer programs from one computer program to another, to initiate or engage in 
such communication with a person who is a minor; and 
2. by means of such communication he importunes, invites or induces a minor to 
engage in sexual intercourse, oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct, or sexual 
contact with him, or to engage in a sexual performance, obscene sexual 
performance, or sexual conduct for his benefit. 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.22 (McKinney 2004) (emphasis added). The statute was enacted to 
address the growing concern that pedophiles are using the Internet as a forum to lure children. 
Foley, 731 N.E.2d at 128 (citing Governor’s Memorandum approving L. 1996, ch. 600, 1996 
N.Y. LAWS 1900–01). 
 94. Foley, 731 N.E.2d at 133. 
 95. Id. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–62 (1982) (upholding a New York 
statute under strict scrutiny to protect minors from dissemination of harmful materials)). 
 96. Hatch v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 471 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
 97. Id. at 472. 
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engage in sex with minors.”98 Accordingly, the court refuted the 
inconsistent regulation argument from Pataki because “no case gives 
such intentions or . . . communications”99 protection under the dormant 
Commerce Clause. Second, the court held that the Pataki court’s 
concerns for extraterritorial effects did not apply because all parties 
involved in the solicitation were domiciled in California and were thus 
subject to California law.100
3. People v. Hsu 
In a subsequent case, the California Court of Appeals in People v. 
Hsu upheld a state luring statute for different reasons.101 Unlike the 
Foley court, the Hsu court conceded that state regulation of the Internet 
triggers dormant Commerce Clause concerns because the “Internet is 
undeniably an incident of interstate commerce.”102 Moreover, unlike the 
Hatch court, the Hsu court applied the Pike balancing test to determine 
the burden on interstate commerce.103 However, it concluded that the 
mere “fact that communication . . . can affect interstate commerce does 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 483–84. 
 101. 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). The California Penal Code states: 
Every person who, with knowledge that a person is a minor, knowingly distributes, sends, 
causes to be sent, exhibits, or offers to distribute or exhibit by electronic mail, the 
Internet . . . , or a commercial online service, any harmful matter, as defined in Section 
313, to a minor with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions 
or sexual desires of that person or of a minor, and with the intent or for the purpose of 
seducing a minor, is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by imprisonment in 
the state prison or in a county jail. A person convicted of a second and any subsequent 
conviction for a violation of this section is guilty of a felony. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.2(b) (West 1997). The code defines “harmful matter” as: 
matter, taken as a whole, which to the average person, applying contemporary statewide 
standards, appeals to the prurient interest, and is matter which, taken as a whole, depicts 
or describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct and which, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. 
Id. § 313(a). 
In People v. Hsu, undercover law enforcement personnel caught a man in ongoing sexual 
communications involving explicit images with a teenage boy over the Internet. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 188–89. The defendant offered to engage in specific sexual acts with the boy and invited the 
boy to meet him at his house. Id. at 189. Defendant appealed his conviction of two counts of 
attempting to distribute or exhibit lewd matter to a minor through the Internet. Id. 
 102. Id. at 190. 
 103. Id. 
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not automatically cause a state [Internet] statute . . . to burden interstate 
commerce.”104
In its analysis, the court refuted each of the three dormant Commerce 
Clause arguments presented in Pataki. First, the court rejected the Pataki 
court’s per se analysis finding that “[a]bsent conflicting federal 
legislation, states retain their authority under their general police powers 
to regulate matters of legitimate local concern, even if interstate 
commerce may be affected.”105 To the extent the statute resulted in 
extraterritorial effects, the court determined that such effects should be 
factored into the Pike balancing test.106 Second, under the Pike test, the 
court determined that California has a “compelling [state] interest in 
protecting minors from harm generally and certainly from being seduced 
to engage in sexual activities.”107 The court found it difficult to conceive 
any burden on legitimate commerce imposed by penalizing the 
transmission of such harmful material to minors.108 Consequently, the 
statute’s burden on commerce was “incidental at best and far outweighed 
by the state’s abiding interest in preventing harm to minors.”109 Finally, 
the court determined that the statute would not subject Internet users to 
inconsistent regulations because the defendant generally is aware of the 
victim’s location and the laws of that jurisdiction.110 Additionally, the 
California statute reflected most jurisdictions’ laws prohibiting 
solicitation of a minor.111
4. State v. Backlund 
Synthesizing the reasoning from Foley and Hsu, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court in State v. Backlund affirmed its state’s power to 
narrowly regulate certain Internet communications by upholding the 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 191. 
 111. See supra note 11. See generally CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 
285 (15th ed. 1995); 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 11 (2004). Under the California statute, “[o]nly when 
the material is disseminated to a known minor with the intent to arouse the prurient interest of the 
sender and/or minor and with the intent to seduce the minor does the dissemination become a 
criminal act.” Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191. Coupling this narrow scope with the penal scheme, 
which requires the act to “occur wholly or partially within the state” to prosecute, the court found the 
statute constitutional because it did not burden interstate commerce. Id. 
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North Dakota luring statute.112 First, the court followed Foley, in finding 
it “difficult to ascertain any legitimate commerce that is derived from the 
willful transmission of explicit or implicit sexual communications to a 
person believed to be a minor in order to willfully lure that person into 
sexual activity.”113 Second, the court held that even if the state Internet 
 112. State v. Backlund, 672 N.W.2d 431 (N.D. 2003). In this case, Backlund participated from 
his home in Minnesota in an Internet chatroom, using the screen name “backdaddyO.” Id. at 433. He 
exchanged multiple messages with an individual using the screen name “Fargobabe 22,” who 
identified herself as a fourteen-year-old girl, but who in actuality was a West Fargo police officer. 
Id. Backlund solicited “Fargobabe 22” to engage in a sexual act, offering to pick her up and take her 
home when they were done. Id. North Dakota charged Backlund with luring a minor by computer in 
violation of the North Dakota luring statute, which criminalized the solicitation of minors over the 
Internet. Id. The North Dakota Code provides the following: 
An adult is guilty of luring minors by computer when: 
1. The adult knows the character and content of a communication that, in whole or 
in part, explicitly or implicitly discusses or depicts actual or simulated nudity, 
sexual acts, sexual contact, sadomasochistic abuse, or other sexual performances 
and uses any computer communication system that allows the input, output, 
examination, or transfer of computer data or computer programs from one computer 
to another to initiate or engage in such communication with a person the adult 
believes to be a minor; and 
2. By means of that communication the adult importunes, invites, or induces a 
person the adult believes to be a minor to engage in sexual acts or to have sexual 
contact with the adult, or to engage in a sexual performance, obscene sexual 
performance, or sexual conduct for the adult’s benefit, satisfaction, lust, passions, or 
sexual desires. 
3. A violation of this section is a class A misdemeanor, but if the adult is twenty-
two years of age or older or the adult reasonably believes the minor is under the age 
of fifteen, the violation of this section is a class C felony. 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-05.1 (2001). As originally introduced, the North Dakota statute 
proscribed luring “a minor” but was amended during the legislative process to criminalize luring “a 
person the adult believes to be a minor” to deal with situations in which minors misrepresent their 
age to adults engaged in Internet solicitation of sexual acts. Hearing on S.B. 2035 Before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, 57th N.D. Legis. Sess. (Jan. 16, 2001) (oral testimony of Ladd Erickson, 
Assistant Morton County State’s Attorney). 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota, therefore, construed the code section to provide that an 
adult is guilty of luring a minor by computer when 
(1) the adult knows the character and content of a communication that explicitly or 
implicitly discusses or depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual acts, sexual contact, 
sadomasochistic abuse, or other sexual performances, (2) the adult willfully uses any 
computer communication system to initiate or engage in such communication with a 
person the adult believes to be a minor, and (3) by means of that communication, the 
adult willfully importunes, invites, or induces the person the adult believes to be a minor 
to engage in sexual acts or have sexual contact with the adult, or to engage in a sexual 
performance, obscene sexual performance, or sexual conduct for the adult’s benefit, 
satisfaction, lust, passions, or sexual desires. 
Backlund, 672 N.W.2d at 442. 
 113. Backlund, 672 N.W. 2d at 438. 
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luring statute were to implicate the dormant Commerce Clause, “its 
effect is incidental at best and far outweighed by the state’s abiding 
interest in preventing harm to minors.”114
IV. ANALYSIS 
The above review of state and federal dormant Commerce Clause 
analyses demonstrates the variety of approaches courts have used, 
ranging from the rigid per se analysis in Pataki and American 
Booksellers to Foley’s determination that the dormant Commerce Clause 
does not even apply to some state Internet statutes. The diverse reasoning 
and interpretation of law in these cases leave us with the following 
questions: (1) Do all forms of Internet activity constitute interstate 
commerce for purposes of dormant Commerce Clause analysis? (2) In 
reviewing state Internet statutes, when should courts apply a per se 
analysis, and when should they apply the Pike balancing test? (3) How 
should the Pike balancing test be applied to state luring statutes? 
Ultimately, the best approach should balance state authority to 
protect the welfare of their citizens against the federal interest of 
facilitating interstate commerce by providing uniform Internet 
regulations. This Comment concludes that the proper balance is struck 
when courts understand that (1) not all Internet activity constitutes 
“interstate commerce”; (2) the Pike balancing test should be applied 
rather than the per se analysis in reviewing state Internet statutes 
intended to protect citizens; and (3) state luring statutes should generally 
be upheld under the Pike balancing test. 
A. Not All Internet Activity Constitutes Interstate Commerce 
Internet activity involving no economic trade—such as luring and 
other forms of sexual predation—should not be subject to dormant 
Commerce Clause scrutiny. However, as seen particularly in Pataki and 
Hsu, many courts assume that Internet communication of any kind 
involves interstate commerce. For example, Pataki held that the Internet, 
by its nature, is entwined with interstate commerce because: (a) “many 
users obtain access to the Internet by means of an on-line service 
provider . . . , which charges a fee for its services,” and (b) “[t]he Internet 
is more than a means of communication; it also serves as a conduit for 
transporting digitized goods” similar to other “instruments of commerce” 
 114. Id. 
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such as railroads, highways, and trucks.115 Thus, in Pataki, “[t]he 
inescapable conclusion is that the Internet represents an instrument of 
interstate commerce, albeit an innovative one; the novelty of the 
technology should not obscure the fact that regulation of the Internet 
impels traditional Commerce Clause considerations.”116 Similarly, but 
without any analysis at all, Hsu also determined that “[t]he Internet is 
undeniably an incident of interstate commerce.”117 Although these courts 
may be justified in reaching their conclusions, the Internet, which 
encompasses almost every aspect of modern life, demands a more 
refined approach. 
The problem lies in the fact that “interstate commerce” is a term used 
to define both the extent of congressional power under Article I and the 
limits of state power under the dormant Commerce Clause. Under Article 
I, Congress can regulate a universe of subjects as long as they involve 
“interstate commerce.” By contrast, the dormant Commerce Clause 
prevents states from discriminating against “interstate commerce.” 
Because both analyses depend on the meaning of “interstate commerce,” 
an ill-defined and nebulous term, a reworking of terminology is 
necessary. “Interstate commerce” should be defined, on the one hand, as 
an enabling power and, on the other, as a blocking power. The following 
discussion will illustrate how the term “interstate commerce,” at least for 
purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause, is narrowly understood to 
apply only to strictly commercial activities. 
1. The Commerce Clause as an enabling power 
Under Article I of the United States Constitution, Congress has 
power to regulate commerce “among the several States.”118 The 
Supreme Court has defined the scope of “interstate commerce,” for the 
purposes of the Article I Commerce Clause analysis, into three general 
areas: channels of interstate commerce,119 instrumentalities of interstate 
 115. Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 116. Id. 
 117. People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). Notably, the Hsu court 
reviewed and upheld a state luring statute as opposed to the dissemination statute that was struck 
down in Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 173. 
 118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 119. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)) (“Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce.”). 
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commerce,120 and “those activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce.”121 The Court generally interprets these three areas broadly 
to include noneconomic activity. For example, “channels of interstate 
commerce” include not only “intercourse and traffic between . . . 
citizens, and . . . the transportation of persons and property,” but also 
“the authority . . . to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from 
immoral and injurious uses.”122 Thus, Article I enables Congress to 
regulate nearly any activity, even those with marginal economic impact. 
2. The Commerce Clause as a blocking power: the dormant  
Commerce Clause 
Contrary to the enabling power described above, the “negative” 
aspect of the Commerce Clause—referred to as the dormant Commerce 
Clause—acts to block state laws that discriminate against “interstate 
commerce.” Because the dormant Commerce Clause is a blocking power 
that limits a state’s sovereign police powers,123 “interstate commerce” is 
 120. Id. (“‘Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from 
intrastate activities.’” (quoting Lopez, 529 U.S. at 558)). Common examples of Congress’s authority 
over such instrumentalities include the regulation of aircraft and thefts from interstate shipments. See 
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971). This authority also extends to “interstate carriers 
as instruments of interstate commerce” and 
embraces the right to control their operations in all matters having such a close and 
substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is essential or appropriate to the 
security of that traffic, to the efficiency of the interstate service, and to the maintenance 
of conditions under which interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair terms and 
without molestation or hindrance. 
Houston E & W Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914). Thus, for example, a railroad 
is subject to congressional regulation as a “highway[] of both interstate and intrastate commerce” 
because “[c]ars are seldom set apart for exclusive use in moving either class of traffic, but generally 
are used interchangeably in moving both.” S. Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 27 (1911). 
 121. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559). This category of 
congressional authority has been recently limited to activities constituting “some sort of economic 
endeavor,” id. at 611, or “apparent commercial character.” Id. at 611 n.4. 
 122. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (quoting Hoke v. 
United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913)); see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) 
(“Congress, following its own conception of public policy concerning the restrictions which may 
appropriately be imposed on interstate commerce, is free to exclude from the commerce articles 
whose use in the states for which they are destined it may conceive to be injurious to the public 
health, morals or welfare, even though the state has not sought to regulate their use.”). 
 123. As sovereign entities, states have inherent police powers. See North Dakota v. United 
States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (“‘[A] State may, in the absence of conflicting federal regulation, 
properly exercise its police powers to regulate and control such shipments during their passage 
through its territory . . . .’” (quoting United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 377–78 
(1973))); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs. Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985) (“[W]e start 
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defined narrowly to include only strictly commercial activity.124 More 
precisely, “the dormant Commerce Clause’s fundamental objective [is 
to] preserve[] a national market for competition undisturbed by 
preferential advantages conferred by a State upon its residents or resident 
competitors.”125
3. Enabling and blocking powers as applied to state police powers 
Pataki and Hsu both failed to use the narrower, “blocking,” 
definition of “interstate commerce” appropriate to the dormant 
Commerce Clause.126 They assumed that, because a state regulation 
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the 
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)))); Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 
346, 351 (1939) (“One of the commonest forms of state action is the exercise of the police power 
directed to the control of local conditions and exerted in the interest of the welfare of the state’s 
citizens.”). 
 124. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (dealing with state 
regulation of truck lengths); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (considering 
state regulation of truck mud flaps). 
 125. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997). The Court explained that 
[o]ur system, fostered by the [dormant] Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every 
craftsmen shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to 
every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no 
foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every 
consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to 
protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been 
the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality. 
Id. at 299–300 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 
U.S. 525, 539 (1949)); see also Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 448–49 (1991) (noting that “[t]he 
Court has often described the Commerce Clause as conferring a ‘right’ to engage in interstate trade 
free from restrictive state regulation” because it “was intended to benefit those who . . . are engaged 
in interstate commerce”); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 280 (1987) (“The 
Commerce Clause by its own force created an area of trade free from interference by the States.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 
(1977) (“[T]he very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade among the 
several States.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 
(1944) (“The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade among the 
several States.”). 
 126. See, e.g., Am. Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 172–73 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(reasoning that one participates in interstate commerce, for purposes of the dormant Commerce 
Clause, by mere “consumption” of the Internet). Even state courts, other than People v. Foley, 731 
N.E.2d 123, 132 (N.Y. 2000), concede that the Internet must be interstate commerce under the 
dormant Commerce Clause. Foley, however, focused on the noneconomic act of luring and 
solicitation and found that such behavior is not legitimate commerce and, therefore, “deserves no 
economic protection.” Id. Although the Foley court recognized the role of legitimate commerce 
(economic activity), it failed to distinguish the goal of free trade under the dormant Commerce 
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involves the Internet, the statute must be regulating “interstate 
commerce” in the broad enabling power sense. However, luring a minor 
over the Internet is generally a noncommercial activity because it does 
not involve commercial transactions and, as such, should not be subject 
to the dormant Commerce Clause blocking power. Unfortunately, Pataki 
and its progeny have interpreted interstate commerce as coextensive with 
Congress’s power to regulate under the Commerce Clause. This 
understanding subjects state regulations to dormant Commerce Clause 
scrutiny whenever a state regulation involves the Internet.127 If courts 
were to more clearly understand the distinction between the enabling and 
blocking powers of the Commerce Clause, they would likely determine 
that state luring statutes and many other forms of noncommercial state 
Internet regulation do not involve “interstate commerce” and are thus 
free from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. 
B. The Pike Balancing Test Should Be Applied Rather than  
the Per Se Analysis 
The trend in federal courts to hold Internet regulatory state statutes 
per se invalid when they have extraterritorial effects or the potential for 
inconsistent regulation may prove to be too harsh, particularly when state 
statutes aim at protecting the welfare of citizens. The Pike balancing test 
is superior to a per se rule for four reasons.  
First, the Supreme Court has never endorsed a per se test, except in 
cases of facially discriminatory statutes. Although Pataki relies on Edgar 
v. MITE Corp. and Healy v. Beer Institute to conclude that extraterritorial 
regulation occurring wholly outside the states’ borders is per se 
invalid,128 the Supreme Court has never mandated such a brightline rule. 
Clause from the broad interpretation of “interstate commerce” under the Commerce Clause. See id. 
at 132–33. 
 127. See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 102–04 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 128. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 177. The court cited Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 
(1982), which struck down the Illinois Business Take-Over Act because it imposed an excessive 
burden on interstate commerce by regulating conduct occurring wholly outside of the state. In 
Edgar, the Illinois Business Take-Over Act required corporations to secure a percentage of Illinois 
shareholders before an out-of-state corporation could purchase an in-state company. Id. The 
Supreme Court struck down the Act for two reasons. First, the Act “directly regulate[d] and 
prevent[ed], unless its terms [were] satisfied, interstate tender offers which in turn would generate 
interstate transactions.” Id. Second, the Act imposed an excessive burden on interstate commerce. Id. 
The Court further explained that “directly” regulating interstate tender offers included those tender 
offers in other states and those “having no connection with Illinois.” Id. at 642 (emphasis added). 
The Pataki court also cited Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 338 (1989), which held a 
state statute unconstitutional when it “tie[d] pricing to the regulatory schemes of other states.” Healy 
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In fact, the Edgar/Healy Courts balanced the state’s interest against the 
burdens imposed on interstate commerce and invalidated the statute after 
determining the burden was excessive because it regulated “commerce 
occurring wholly outside that State’s borders.”129
Second, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of 
allowing states to regulate matters of local concern. As noted by Justice 
Powell in Kassel, a state’s interest in safety is among “those that ‘the 
Court has been most reluctant to invalidate.’”130 His further explanation 
that such state interests carry a “strong presumption of validity”131 
suggests that a balancing approach is preferred in such cases because a 
per se approach would impose a myopic focus on the interest of interstate 
commerce.  
Third, the extraterritorial effects should be considered as part of a 
balancing, rather than per se, analysis because all state Internet 
regulations have extraterritorial effects to some degree or another. Pataki 
is correct in noting that there is no way to limit the effects of a statute to 
one state, but the mere fact that it has an extraterritorial effect does not 
mean the state will not have an overriding interest.  
Finally, when the extraterritorial effect of a state statute imposes 
inconsistent regulations on Internet users, such an effect should not 
render a statute per se invalid. Rather, the burden created by the 
inconsistency should be balanced against its benefits, particularly when 
the state seeks to protect the welfare of its citizens or when the 
inconsistencies are relatively minor, as in dissemination and luring 
statutes.  
invalidated a statute that required only “out-of-state shippers [to] affirm that their prices [were] no 
higher than the prices being charged in the border States as of the moment of affirmation.” Id. at 
335. 
Pataki and its progeny, however, misleadingly interpret the Edgar/Healy reasoning as 
mandating a per se analysis whenever there is an extraterritorial effect. Rather, the Edgar/Healy 
extraterritorial argument is only valid when “a state law . . . has the ‘practical effect’ of regulating 
commerce occurring wholly outside that State’s borders.” Healy, 491 U.S. at 332. Consequently, 
although a court may strike down a statute for regulating extraterritorial activity, it may only do so 
when the state is attempting to regulate activity of which no part occurs within the regulating state. 
Statutes aimed at protecting a state’s citizens, particularly minors, from harmful Internet activity, 
such as pornography and luring, are clearly aimed at regulating communication partly, if not wholly 
within the State. Therefore, it is improper to apply extraterritorial regulations as an independent test 
in such circumstances. 
 129. Healy, 491 U.S. at 332. 
 130. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981) (quoting Raymond Motor 
Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443 (1978)). 
 131. Id. 
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C. State Luring Statutes Should Withstand the Pike Balancing Test 
Because the per se analysis is improper, dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges to state Internet luring statutes should be reviewed, and 
generally upheld, under the Pike balancing test. Under the Pike analysis, 
a state’s compelling interest to protect minors from the psychological and 
physical damage caused by sexual predators easily outweighs any burden 
imposed on Internet commerce. Courts and commentators are only 
beginning to understand the types of burdens such regulations may 
impose,132 but the following discussion will describe the most pertinent 
benefits and burdens that should enter into this analysis. 
1. States have a compelling interest in protecting minors from sexually 
explicit Internet materials 
Backlund, Foley, Hatch, and Hsu each held that a state’s interest in 
protecting minors from sexually explicit elements of the Internet was a 
compelling one.133 The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in 
New York v. Ferber, noting that “[i]t is evident beyond the need for 
elaboration that a State’s interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and 
psychological well-being of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’”134 The Court 
 132. For a discussion of unique ways in which the dormant Commerce Clause operates within 
the context of the Internet, see Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 8, at 814; Michael W. Loudenslager, 
Allowing Another Policeman on the Information Superhighway: State Interests and Federalism on 
the Internet in the Face of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 191, 243–56 (2003). 
Loudenslager suggests that courts should recognize and account for “(1) the interactivity of a 
Web site, (2) the type of goods sold on the site (whether tangible or electronic), and (3) the 
availability of technology to verify the geographic location of site users.” Loudenslager, supra, at 
197. Ultimately, he proposes that these three factors make up the substance of a Pike balancing 
analysis. This Comment argues that although those three factors should be considered under Pike, 
the Pike balance should additionally include factors such as extraterritorial regulation and 
inconsistent regulations. 
Goldsmith and Sykes, on the other hand, present Pike balancing, extraterritorial regulation, 
and inconsistent regulations as three separate analyses for the constitutionality of state Internet 
regulation. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 8, at 822–23. Unfortunately, the authors fail to 
recommend specific factors under each analysis. The Goldsmith and Sykes article lacks a discussion 
about which factors courts should consider under a benefit/burden analysis of the Internet and 
dormant Commerce Clause. Although this Comment relies in part on and reaches essentially the 
same conclusion as Goldsmith and Sykes, it differs from their article because it advocates specific 
factors to consider under Pike. 
 133. See People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Foley, 731 
N.E.2d 123, 132 (N.Y. 2000); State v. Backlund, 672 N.W.2d 431, 437 (N.D. 2003). 
 134. 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 
596, 607 (1982)) (permitting New York to prohibit the distribution of sexually explicit material 
depicting minors engaged in sexual performances). 
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further emphasized that it has repeatedly “sustained legislation aimed at 
protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the 
laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected 
rights.”135
Although the Court decided Ferber over twenty years ago, the 
advent of the Internet has more urgently made “[t]he prevention of 
sexual exploitation and abuse of children . . . a government objective of 
surpassing importance.”136 The year 2000 report of the National Center 
for Missing and Exploited Children emphasized a state’s need to protect 
its minor citizens.137 Although one-third of parents involved in the case 
study had filtering or blocking software on their computer(s) at the time 
of the interview, predators still accessed many of their children online 
because filtering systems provide inadequate protection.138 This 
inadequacy demonstrates the urgent need for state governments to bring 
their resources to bear in preventing and ending the sexual solicitation of 
minors over the Internet. 
Furthermore, state luring statutes are likely to successfully protect 
minors. Although Pataki suggested that dissemination statutes are 
doomed to fail due to the multiple sources of Internet pornography, the 
same cannot be said of state luring statutes. Such statutes are effective 
because they allow law enforcement agencies, which are generally aware 
of the predator through undercover chatroom contacts, to use 
investigative resources to track down the identity of the offender and 
keep logs of all online interactions as evidence of the crime.139
 135. Id. at 757. 
 136. Id. (emphasis added). 
 137. See supra notes 1–2. The research concluded that approximately twenty percent of 
children who use the Internet regularly were exposed to some form of sexual approach or solicitation 
on the Internet. In that same year, one in thirty-three children received an aggressive solicitation, 
defined as “offline contact,” in which the solicitor telephoned, sent letters, provided money or gifts, 
or invited the child to meet somewhere. Id. 
 138. Id. For a discussion of the effectiveness of software filters, see Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. 
Ct. 2783, 2802 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[F]iltering software, as presently available, does not 
solve the ‘child protection’ problem.”). In dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice O’Connor, described four inadequacies of filter systems. First, filtering is often faulty, 
permitting some pornographic material “to pass through without hindrance.” Id. Second, filtering 
software costs money, an often large expense most American families are unable to afford. Id. Third, 
parents must take an active role in regulating the filtering system to ensure its effectiveness and 
utility—unfortunately, most parents are far too little involved in their children’s lives. Id. Finally, 
“software blocking lacks precision.” Id. 
 139. See DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL., CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN RESEARCH CENTER, 
INTERNET SEX CRIMES AGAINST MINORS: THE RESPONSE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2003), available 
at http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV70.pdf. 
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2. The effects on interstate commerce are incidental 
Admittedly, it is difficult to balance the interest of protecting a child 
from exploitation against the interest of commerce. However, in cases 
involving luring statutes, the burdens on interstate commerce are 
incidental, compared to the costs that local communities would otherwise 
incur when Internet predators are not checked. Courts should consider 
the following factors when determining whether a state luring statute 
imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce under the Pike test: (a) 
the degree to which states may regulate activities occurring wholly 
outside their borders, (b) the degree to which Internet users will be 
subject to inconsistent regulations, and (c) the degree to which state 
regulation will “chill” Internet use.140
First, a state Internet luring statute may affect, in theory, 
communications occurring wholly outside the state, but this danger is 
greatly reduced by most criminal jurisdiction statutes, which limit the 
reach of state criminal laws to conduct occurring wholly or partly within 
the state.141 Although Internet businesses may not always be able to 
accurately determine the state in which a client lives, an Internet predator 
is usually well aware of the location of his or her victim—especially 
when proposing a meeting location. Thus, there is little danger that an 
Internet predator will be unaware of the jurisdiction with which he is 
dealing. 
Moreover, there is little danger that an Internet predator will be 
subject to conflicting state regulations because soliciting sex from a 
minor is illegal in all jurisdictions.142 Against this uniform condemnation 
of the sexual solicitation of minors, the fact that one state’s Internet 
luring statute may differ from another’s does not impose a significant 
burden on Internet users. As the Washington Supreme Court concluded 
in State v. Heckel, a state Internet regulation that does nothing more than 
 140. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (providing the specific language upon 
which Backlund, Hsu, and Hatch rely in their Pike analysis concerning the compelling state interest 
to protect minors from harmful materials). 
 141. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-201(1)(a) (2003). 
 142. The common law has long-recognized the crime of rape and statutory rape, and all fifty 
states apparently recognize such crimes. See generally, TORCIA, supra note 13, § 285 (citing state 
law prohibiting statutory rape); 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape §§ 11, 20 (2004) (noting that most jurisdictions 
prohibit attempted statutory rape). 
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impose a preexisting duty on Internet users is not an undue burden on 
interstate commerce.143
 143. State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 405 (Wash. 2001). In this antispam case, the Supreme Court 
of Washington also rejected Pataki.’s handling of the Internet and dormant Commerce Clause. The 
Washington Attorney General’s Office began investigating Jason Heckel after numerous recipients 
of his mass e-mails filed complaints. As early as 1996, Jason Heckel of Oregon began sending 
unsolicited commercial e-mail (UCE), or “spam,” over the Internet as part of his Natural Instincts 
business. Id. at 406. “The booklet described how to set up an on-line promotional business, acquire 
free e-mail accounts, and obtain software for sending bulk e-mail. . . . Heckel marketed the booklet 
by sending between 100,000 and 1,000,000 UCE messages per week.” Id. Between 1997 and 1998, 
Heckel developed, marketed, and sold a forty-six page online booklet entitled “How to Profit from 
the Internet.” Id. The State of Washington filed three causes of action against Heckel, including a 
claim under its state Consumer Protection Act (“the Act”). Id. at 407. The Act makes sending spam a 
per se violation: 
(1) No person may initiate the transmission, conspire with another to initiate the 
transmission, or assist the transmission, of a commercial electronic mail message from a 
computer located in Washington or to an electronic mail address that the sender knows, 
or has reason to know, is held by a Washington resident that: 
a. Uses a third party’s internet domain name without permission of the third party, 
or otherwise misrepresents or obscures any information in identifying the point of 
origin or the transmission path of a commercial electronic mail message; or 
b. Contains false or misleading information in the subject line. 
(2) For purposes of this section, a person knows that the intended recipient of a 
commercial electronic mail message is a Washington resident if that information is 
available, upon request, from the registrant of the Internet domain name contained in the 
recipient’s electronic mail address. 
Id. at 407 n.6 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 19.190.020 (1999)). 
In considering the constitutionality of the Act, the court noted that even though some statutes 
may “‘create additional, but not irreconcilable, obligations,’ they ‘are not considered to be 
inconsistent’ for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis.” id. at 412 (citations omitted) 
(quoting Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 35 F.3d 813, 826 (3d Cir. 1994)). To 
support its reasoning, the court relied on Pike and disregarded Pataki. The court first established that 
the Act was not facially discriminatory because it applied evenhandedly to all in-state and out-of-
state spammers. Id. at 408–09. Additionally, the court examined the Pike balancing test and noted 
that contrary to recent Internet and Commerce Clause developments, which treat extraterritorial 
regulation and inconsistent regulations as separate Commerce Clause tests, each of those two 
“‘unsettled and poorly understood’ aspects of the dormant Commerce Clause” is actually a facet of 
the Pike balancing test. Id. at 411. Consequently, in its Pike analysis, the court looked to other states 
and found that most have also “passed legislation regulating electronic solicitations.” Id. at 411–12. 
Moreover, the truthfulness requirement of the Act did not conflict with any requirements in other 
states, and some other states’ statutes included additional requirements. Id. at 412.  
Finally, in its Pike analysis, the court determined that spam causes economic harm to ISPs, to 
actual users of forged domains, and to e-mail users. Weighing the economic harms to citizens 
against the incidental burden of requiring truthfulness, the Washington Supreme Court found the Act 
constitutionally sound under the Pike balancing test. The court heavily weighed the following factual 
descriptions of burdens spam places on Internet users: 
A federal district court described the harms a mass e-mailer caused ISP CompuServe: 
In the present case, any value CompuServe realizes from its computer equipment is 
wholly derived from the extent to which that equipment can serve its subscriber 
base . . . . [H]andling the enormous volume of mass mailings that CompuServe 
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Finally, luring statutes are unlikely to have any type of “chilling 
effect” on Internet commerce because they proscribe only a narrow range 
of Internet activity. Most luring statutes are limited to Internet 
communications in which the sender intends to engage in sexual activity 
with the recipient knowing that the recipient is a minor. Thus, absent 
such intent, most communications, including sexually explicit 
communications between adults or even between adults and minors, 
would not be affected. Similarly, Pataki.’s concern that “costs of 
compliance, coupled with the threat of serious criminal sanctions for 
failure to comply, could drive some Internet users off the Internet 
altogether”144 fails to justify placing commerce above the welfare of 
children. People who use the Internet to solicit minors will not lose any 
legitimate commercial gains, and legitimate businesses will likely not run 
afoul of Internet luring statutes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As the “nuclear bomb of legal theory against state Internet 
regulations,”145 the dormant Commerce Clause demands immediate 
attention. As seen with the contrasting reasoning found in the recent 
federal and state cases, the dormant Commerce Clause dilemma has 
federal courts pitted against state supreme courts in a battle over 
authority to regulate Internet communications. With staggering statistics 
revealing that approximately twenty percent of children are solicited over 
the Internet, three percent of whom receive aggressive sexual 
receives places a tremendous burden on its equipment. Defendants’ more recent 
practice of evading CompuServe’s filters by disguising the origin of their messages 
commandeers even more computer resources because CompuServe’s computers are 
forced to store undeliverable e-mail messages and labor in vain to return the 
messages to an address that does not exist. To the extent that defendant’s 
multitudinous electronic mailings demand the disk space and drain the processing 
power of plaintiff’s computer equipment, those resources are not available to serve 
CompuServe subscribers. Therefore, the value of that equipment to CompuServe is 
diminished even though it is not physically damaged by defendants’ conduct. 
Id. at 409 (citations omitted) (quoting CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 
1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (granting a preliminary injunction against a bulk e-mailer on the theory 
of trespass to chattels)); see also Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (E.D. Va. 1998) 
(relying on the reasoning of CompuServe and finding that a bulk e-mailer “injured AOL’s business 
goodwill and diminished the value of its possessory interest in its computer network”). 
 144. Am. Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 145. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 8 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
McCullagh, supra note 8). 
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solicitations,146 states should be allowed to protect children from such 
threats.  
Indeed, the Commerce Clause was never intended to impede states’ 
ability to protect children from sexual predators. Nevertheless, the 
growing trend in federal courts is to preclude states from creating 
Internet regulations. This narrow interpretation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause, particularly one that allows courts to strike down 
state statutes using a harsh per se approach, renders states powerless to 
protect citizens from Internet harms. This Comment demonstrates that a 
proper interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause requires courts to 
employ a balancing approach, which takes into consideration the state’s 
purpose, the degree to which it regulates citizens of other states, the 
danger of inconsistent regulations, and the potential for chilling Internet 
commerce. Only when all these factors are considered will a court be 
able to appropriately assess the validity of state Internet statutes in the 
context of the federal system and the global communication network. 
Within this framework, state and federal courts should readily uphold 
state Internet luring statutes.  
Julie Sorenson Stanger 
 
 146. ONLINE VICTIMIZATION, supra note 1, at 1. 
